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Episodic–autobiographical memory (EAM) is considered to emerge gradually in concert
with the development of other cognitive abilities (such as executive functions, personal
semantic knowledge, emotional knowledge, theory of mind (ToM) functions, language,
and working memory). On the brain level its emergence is accompanied by structural
and functional reorganization of different components of the so-called EAM network.
This network includes the hippocampal formation, which is viewed as being vital for
the acquisition of memories of personal events for long-term storage. Developmental
studies have emphasized socio-cultural-linguistic mechanisms that may be unique to the
development of EAM. Furthermore it was hypothesized that one of the main functions
of EAM is the social one. In the research field, the link between EAM and social
cognition remains however debated. Herein we aim to bring new insights into the relation
between EAM and social information processing (including social cognition) by describing
a young adult patient with amnesia with neurodevelopmental mechanisms due to
perinatal complications accompanied by hypoxia. The patient was investigated medically,
psychiatrically, and with neuropsychological and neuroimaging methods. Structural high
resolution magnetic resonance imaging revealed significant bilateral hippocampal atrophy
as well as indices for degeneration in the amygdalae, basal ganglia, and thalamus, when
a less conservative threshold was applied. In addition to extensive memory investigations
and testing other (non-social) cognitive functions, we employed a broad range of tests
that assessed social information processing (social perception, social cognition, social
regulation). Our results point to both preserved (empathy, core ToM functions, visual affect
selection, and discrimination, affective prosody discrimination) and impaired domains of
social information processing (incongruent affective prosody processing, complex social
judgments). They support proposals for a role of the hippocampal formation in processing
more complex social information that likely requires multimodal relational handling.
Keywords: episodic–autobiographical memory, social information processing, theory of mind, hippocampus,
hypoxia
INTRODUCTION
Memory is divided according to time and content axes, respec-
tively (Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012). Along the content
axis, five long-term memory systems were described [procedural,
priming, perceptual, semantic, and episodic–autobiographical
memory (EAM) systems] (Tulving, 2005). These systems are
considered to build up on each other ontogenetically and phylo-
genetically. EAM is considered the last ontogenetic and phyloge-
netic achievement (Nelson, 2003, 2005; Nelson and Fivush, 2004;
Tulving, 2005). It is currently defined as being the conjunction of
subjective time, autonoetic consciousness, and the experiencing
self (Tulving, 2005). Autonoetic consciousness has been concep-
tualized in slightly different ways. Wheeler et al. (1997, p. 335)
defined it as the “capacity that allows adult humans to men-
tally represent and to become aware of their protracted existence
across subjective time.” Lemogne et al. (2006, p. 260) stated that
autonoetic consciousness entails a “sense of self in time and the
ability to relive subjective experiences from the encoding context
by mentally traveling back in time.” Markowitsch proposed that
autonoetic consciousnes is characterized by a superior ability to
reflect upon oneself and distinguish oneself from the social and
biological environment (Markowitsch, 2003; Markowitsch and
Staniloiu, 2011a). While the latter definition of autonoetic con-
sciousness might suggest a link between EAM and the dialectic of
self and others (Suddendorf et al., 2009), the relationship between
EAM (Tulving, 2005;Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012) and social
cognition [theory of mind (ToM), empathy, simulation, social
judgment, moral judgment] (Adolphs, 2010a) remains debated,
and insufficiently explored experimentally.
Several authors proposed that EAM or autonoetic conscious-
ness modulate an individual’s capacity to make inferences about
others’mental states and feelings, and distinguish these states from
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 342 | 1
Staniloiu et al. Developmental amnesia
his or her own ones (Batson et al., 1996; Bluck et al., 2005; Saxe
et al., 2006; Staniloiu et al., 2010a). Tulving (2005) remarked that
Darwin’s description of “moral being” had alluded to several fea-
tures, which may be tied to morality, such as the capability for
recollecting the past, the capacity for autonoetic consciousness
and the ability to subjectively mentally travel in time, both into
past and future. In this vein, difficulties with recollecting emo-
tional events and/or autonoetic consciousness were propounded
to exist in offenderswith psychopathy, who feature impairments in
empathy and affective ToM (Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz,
2007; Craig et al., 2009). Croft et al.’s (2010) results suggested that
severe EAM impairments due to neurological incidents may affect
the updating of moral character judgments and subsequently may
influence the way these individuals perceive and behave toward
others. The authors compared in their study the performance of
patients with bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex to that of patients with bilateral damage to the hippocampal
formation (due to hypoxia/anoxia or herpes viral encephalitis)
and that of a control brain-damaged group during a task that
required the participants to make moral judgments about unfa-
miliar persons in two conditions (before and after being exposed to
various social context scenarios). In contrast to patients with bilat-
eral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, patients with
bilateral hippocampal damage presented with severe impairments
in consciousmnemonic processing, interfering with their everyday
life. During the moral updating task, they furthermore demon-
strated the largest amount of change in moral judgments after
social scenario manipulations, compared to patients with bilat-
eral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, who showed
the least amount of change.
Social cognition (ToM) deficits were reported to co-occur with
memory impairments in several psychiatric conditions, includ-
ing dissociative (functional) amnesia (Corcoran and Frith, 2003;
Reinhold and Markowitsch, 2007, 2008, 2009; Fujiwara et al.,
2008). Kritchevsky et al. (2004, p. 224) described a patient with
functional amnesia who after the onset of amnesia became “less
aware of the feelings of other individuals.” He furthermore did
not comprehend jokes anymore and “interpreted them literally”
(Kritchevsky et al., 2004, p. 224). Interpersonal difficulties with
family members have been reported to occur after the onset of
dissociative amnesia and were partly attributed to an impaired
ability to properly read the familiar/close others’ mental states
(Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012; Staniloiu and Markowitsch, 2012;
Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2013).
Reinhold and Markowitsch (2007) formally assessed emotional
processing and social cognition in two female adolescents (age
16 and 18, respectively) suffering from dissociative amnesia. They
found that both patients were impaired on the German-language
adaptation of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET)
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Fleck et al., 2002; Dziobek et al., 2006;
Fujiwara et al., 2008) and emotional evaluation of ToM stories
(Kalbe et al., 2007). In a case series of five patients with dis-
sociative (functional) amnesia, three out of the four patients in
whom the RMET was administered, showed performance deficits
on it. Dissociative amnesia is however often accompanied by other
psychiatric or medical comorbidities, such as major depressive dis-
order (Staniloiu and Markowitsch, 2012). One could furthermore
argue that, even when the co-occurring symptoms of depression
do not reach the threshold for a diagnosis of an affective disorder
according to the international nosologies’ diagnostic criteria (so-
called subclinical symptoms of depression), they can still impact
on ToM functions (Cusi et al., 2011). It was speculated that in some
psychopathological conditions (Corcoran and Frith, 2003), which
are known to have a neurodevelopmental basis, the co-occurrence
of EAM and ToM deficits may reflect a developmental arrest of
closely in time emerging neurocognitive functions, which are at
that stage functionally interdependent (Perner, 2000; Bird et al.,
2004; Nelson and Fivush, 2004). Other authors proposed that in
certain forms of psychopathologies, an idiosyncratic way of mak-
ing inferences about the mental states of others might take place,
due to a failure of inhibition of own perspective and/or a poverty
of models of the inner world of others (Newen and Schlicht,
2009). Functional neuroimaging studies suggested common (but
also distinct) neural substrates for EAM and ToM (Spreng et al.,
2008; Rabin et al., 2010; Spreng and Grady, 2010; Abu-Akel and
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). A recent investigation of healthy female
participants revealed that the degree of neural overlap depends
on the target person involved in the ToM task; when participants
engaged in making inferences about the mental states of famil-
iar others as opposed to unfamiliar others, they seemed to recruit
more EAM-related brain areas, suggesting the use of a different
cognitive strategy (despite identical task instructions) (Rabin and
Rosenbaum, 2012).
By contrast, there are reports of patients with amnesia sec-
ondary to neurological brain insults incurred in adulthood with
no detectable deficit on ToM functions (as assessed by using stan-
dardized laboratory tasks). Rosenbaum et al. (2007) investigated
with a battery of widely employed tests (Stone et al., 1998; Castelli
et al., 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Dennis et al., 2001; Stuss
et al., 2001) two patients with amnesia with onset after severe
traumatic brain injury [patient K.C. (Rosenbaum et al., 2005)
and patient M. L. (Levine et al., 1998, 2009)] and found that
their performance did not significantly differ from that of 14 con-
trol participants on all measures. In addition, despite speculations
that social cognition and EAM might depend on each other dur-
ing early development (Perner, 2000; Nelson and Fivush, 2004), a
recent study of an adult female patient (HC) with developmental
amnesia showed that the patient performed within normal lim-
its on a variety of standardized tests that assessed her capacity for
ToM (Rabin et al., 2012). The applied testing battery consisted of:
the False belief and the Faux pas tests (Stone et al., 1998), the 36
black and white photographs variant of the RMET (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001), the Sarcasm and Empathy Test (Dennis et al., 2001),
the Visual Perspective-Taking and Deception Test (Stuss et al.,
2001), and the Animation Test (Castelli et al., 2000).
The term developmental amnesia is a non-DSM-IV-TR (2000)
terminology that designates a syndrome that occurs in child-
hood and is caused by relatively selective damage to hippocampi
(usually resulting in more than 30–40% bilateral volume reduc-
tion of hippocampi in comparison to controls). Some involve-
ment of the basal ganglia (bilaterally), thalamus (bilaterally),
and right retrosplenial cortex, which was demonstrated in voxel-
based morphometry studies had been reported as well (Vargha-
Khadem et al., 1997, 2003; Isaacs et al., 2003). Consistent with
the hypoxia-anoxia pathogenetic model (see below), in a patient
with developmental amnesia white matter changes (e.g., thinning
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of the corpus callosum) were additionally remarked and in
another cerebellar atrophy was noted (Vargha-Khadem et al.,
1997; Gadian et al., 2000; Connolly et al., 2007).
The most common cause of relatively selective hippocampi
damage is single or recurrent episodes of ischemic-hypoxia, which
were reported to occur perinatally or in childhood until prepu-
bertal period. Affected children can still acquire knowledge about
facts and language skills depending on their intellectual ability
that can range from low to normal, but show severe impairments
in the episodic–autobiographical domain and everyday memory
(Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012; Willoughby et al., 2012).
Most recently, studies of young adults with childhood develop-
mental amnesia have focused on investigating the ability to imag-
ine the future and on distinguishing between recollection/recall
and familiarity/recognition (Kwan et al., 2010; Maguire et al.,
2010). Little has, however, been devoted to a thorough investi-
gation of social information processing in these cases, according
to our knowledge.
Herein we provide a review, interpretation and critical discus-
sion of results obtained with various tasks tapping on social cog-
nition as well as other aspects of social information processing in a
young adult male patient with amnesia with neurodevelopmental
mechanisms. When we speak of social information processing, we
use as guiding framework the classification described in Table 1 of
Adolphs (2010a). In this table, Adolphs (2010a) depicted the fol-
lowing three stages of social information processing: social percep-
tion (perception of pheromones, face and speech perception, and
perception of social touch and biological motion), social cognition
(affective and cognitive ToM, simulation, empathy, social judg-
ment, moral judgment), and social regulation (cognitive control,
emotion regulation, monitoring/error correction, self-reflection,
deception).
CASE REPORT
ML is a 29-year-old man who was 27-year-old at the time of the
neuropsychological testing in our clinic. He is the oldest of three
children, coming from a middle class family. Both of his siblings
achieved higher education. His parents divorced when ML was a
teenager. ML was born prematurely, at 33 weeks of gestation. After
birth, he required a 2-week hospitalization for lung immaturity in
a neonatal intensive care unit, where he received oxygen therapy.
In terms of developmental milestones, ML began talking at age
13 months. Some stuttering was noted in childhood, but it ceased
later on. From age 3 months until age 1 year, ML received physical
therapy for problems with motor tone and muscle coordination.
Sitting was delayed (he was older than 1 year when he was able to
sit). He beganwalking at age 18months and completed toilet train-
ing at age 3 years. At age 2 years, ML underwent another course
of physical therapy. Both therapies followed the model developed
by Vaclav Vojta (Sadowska, 2001) and were successful; however
they were perceived byML’s mother as having been psychologically
traumatizing. Clumsiness and other (usually transient) problems
with motor skills were reported in other patients with develop-
mental amnesia, who sustained hypoxic-ischemic events during
the first year of life (Gadian et al., 2000; Vargha-Khadem et al.,
2003). However, the reported difficulties weremilder than the ones
experienced by ML. Although postulated, a connection between
the basal ganglia (and thalamic) damage and motor impairment
in cases of developmental amnesia remained unclear (Gadian et al.,
2000; Vargha-Khadem et al., 2003; de Haan et al., 2006).
ML entered kindergarten at age 4 years and was described dur-
ing those time as being reserved and a daydreamer. Since age five
ML has seen several health care providers and has been suspected
of having several diagnoses such as Minimal Cerebral Dysfunction
(MCD), autistic spectrum disorder, Asperger’s syndrome, atten-
tion hyperactivity deficit disorder. None of these diagnoses was
confirmed. ML’s case may therefore reflect other cases of develop-
mental amnesia from the literature, where an accurate diagnosis
was far from being “straightforward” from the beginning (Gadian
et al., 2000). As Gadian et al. (2000) remarked, it is not uncom-
mon for problems with episodic memory–which typically become
evident around age 5 or 6 years (in conformity with data on the
ontogenesis of episodic memory; Nelson and Fivush, 2004) – to
be initially attributed to attention deficits. Several motor tics and
substantial problems with school performance were noted when
ML was around the age of 7 years, shortly after he had entered
the school. Problems with organization, memory for life events as
well as performing several real-world memory tasks (Willoughby
et al., 2012) were remarked. In the absence of a comprehensive and
rigorous neuropsychological investigation at the time, ML’s poor
school functioning initially was however conjectured to reflect
primary attention and concentration difficulties (Lebrun-Givois
et al., 2008). On an interpersonal level, ML reportedly experienced
difficulties establishing social contact with other peers during his
early school years. He often imitated emotions or behaviors of
others, instead of expressing his own feelings. Although not com-
monly reported, social and emotional difficulties were described in
other patients with diagnoses of developmental amnesia by other
authors (Picard et al., 2012).
ML later on outgrew his tics. Because of his persisting diffi-
culties in school, ML was supervised by a school psychologist. In
the following years, ML continued to experience memory impair-
ments and lack of organization. Despite of otherwise good intel-
lectual functions, he continued to fail school, which prompted
his family to seek psychiatric help for him. Therefore, at age
16 years ML was brought by his mother for a comprehensive
medical and neuropsychological assessment. Contrary to expecta-
tions, the neuropsychological assessment revealed above average
attention and concentration abilities; verbal short-term memory
was average, digit span was above average, his visual short-term
memory was average and word fluency was within normal limits.
ML was fully oriented. Verbal and visual memory performance
after delays of half an hour were however impaired. ML dis-
played no evidence of distractibility and showed no heightened
level of interference. There was no evidence of perseveration
or apraxia, stereotypes, or tics. The neuropsychologist’s recom-
mendation was that ML should undergo memory rehabilitation
training, although no clear diagnosis was provided.
A routine electroencephalography (EEG), which was per-
formed at the time, yielded no evidence of seizures or epilepsy.
Both computer tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imag-
ing (MRI) scans of the head were performed. The CT showed a dis-
crete enlargement of the lateral ventricles downright.MRI revealed
a small gliotic mass in the left thalamus and discrete prominence of
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Table 1 | Summary of test results.
Test Result Below Low Average High Above Remark(s)
average average (PC = 25–75) average average
(PC < 16) (PC = 16–24) (PC = 76–84) (PC > 84)
LATERALITY
Laterality-preference-inventary
Eye Score = +4 (scores reach from −4 [left] via 0 [ambidexter] to +4 [right]) Clearly right oriented
Ear Score = −4 Clearly right oriented
Hand Score = −2 More left oriented
Foot Score = +4 Clearly right oriented
Questionnaire for measuring motor
asymmetry
Handedness Score = −16 (+8 to +20: right, −7 to +7: symmetrical, −8 to −20: left) Left
Footedness Score = 0 (+4 to +2: right, −1 to +1: symmetrical, −2 to −4: left) Symmetrical
LANGUAGE
Boston naming test 57 Out of 60 items X Unremarkable
PERCEPTION
Judgment of line orientation
Correct 35 X
False 0 X
NUMBER CALCULATION AND ARITHMETICS
ZRT
Number processing
Written transcoding Score = 3 X Normal
Calculation
Calculation by heart Score = 6 X Normal
Written calculation Score = 6 X Normal
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONS
Non-verbal
LPS-4 (logical thinking) IQ = 130 X 34 Correct
Mosaic-test (HAWIE-R) Score = 19 X Maximal score
Matrices-test Score = 14 X 25 Out of 26 correct,
maximal score
reached
Verbal
Finding of commonalities (HAWIE-R) Score = 11 X
MWT-B IQ = 97 X 26 Correct
SHORT-TERM MEMORY
Numerical
Digit span forward (WMS-R) PC = 97 X 8 Digits
Visual
Block span forward (WMS-R) PC = 65 X 7 Blocks
WORKING MEMORY
Numerical
Digit span backward (WMS-R) PC > 98 X 7 Digits
Adaptive digit ordering test 10/12 Points X 7 Digits
Visual
Block span backward (WMS-R) PC = 78 X 6 Blocks
ANTEROGRADE MEMORY
Verbal
VLMT
First trial PC = 60–75 X 8 Words
Fifth trial PC < 5 X 9 Words
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Test Result Below Low Average High Above Remark(s)
average average (PC = 25–75) average average
(PC < 16) (PC = 16–24) (PC = 76–84) (PC > 84)
Total score PC = 5 X 42 Words
Interference list PC = 85 X 9 Words
Direct recall PC = 0 X 1 Word
Delayed recall (30min) PC = 0 X 1 Word
Forgetting rate (trial 5 – direct recall) PC = 0 X Loss: 8 words
Forgetting rate (trial 5 – delayed recall) PC = 0 X Loss: 8 words
Recognition PC = 0 X 6 Correct, 9 false
positives
Logical memory I (WMS-R) PC = 18 X 21 Details
Logical memory II (WMS-R) PC = 0 X 2 Details (after
request)
Figural
Rey-Osterrieth figure
Delayed recall PC = 0 X 2 Details
Doors and people test
Doors test A (recognition) 11 Out of 12 X
Benton visual retention test
Free direct recall 8
Number correct 2 X Expected number
correct: 9
Number of errors 0 X Expected number
errors: 1
Free recall, delayed 8 X For delayed recall no
norms exist
Delayed recall recognition X
ANTEROGRADE MEMORY FOR EMOTIONAL INFORMATION
Emotional pictures
Correct recognitions 24 Out of 40 See text for
comments
False recognitions 9 9 Falsely recognized
distractors
Picture story for affect induction
(BAd)
Emotional story
Free recall (immediate) 4 Details +1 Incorrect detail
Recognition
Picture 1 5 Out of 7
Picture 2 3 Out of 7
Picture 3 3 Out of 7
Picture 4 7 Out of 7
Picture 5 3 Out of 7
Picture 6 3 Out of 7
Picture 7 3 Out of 7
Picture 8 3 Out of 7
Picture 9 3 Out of 7
Picture 10 1 Out of 7
Initial phase (pictures 1–4) 18 Out of 28 64% (Control group
[CG]: 83%)
Middle part (pictures 5–7) 9 Out of 21 42.8% (Emotional
part; CG: 77%)
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Test Result Below Low Average High Above Remark(s)
average average (PC = 25–75) average average
(PC < 16) (PC = 16–24) (PC = 76–84) (PC > 84)
End phase (pictures 8–10) 7 Out of 21 33.3% (CG: 73%; see
text)
Non-emotional story
Free recall (immediate) 4 Details No difference
between the
emotional and the
non-emotional story
RETROGRADE MEMORY/SEMANTIC OLD MEMORY
Semantic old memory inventory 80/81 Points Normal
Famous faces test
1980–1985 (n = 10) Free recall: 40%, recognition: 10%, together: 50% (age of ML: < 2 years)
1985–1990 (n = 10) Free recall: 20%, recognition: 0%, together: 20% (age of ML: 2–7 years)
1990–1995 (n = 10) Free recall: 50%, recognition: 30%, together: 80% (age of ML: 7–12 years)
1995–2000 (n = 10) Free recall 40%, recognition: 30%, together: 70% (age of ML: 12–17 years)
2000–2010 (n = 43) Free recall: 57%, recognition: 14%, together: 71% (age of ML: 17–27 years)
Famous names test (n = 72) Normal
Correct 87.5%
Incorrect –
No response 12.5%
Famous terms test (n = 86) Unremarkable
Correct 86%
Incorrect –
No response 14%
Famous events test
1994 (n = 5) 2 Spontaneously recalled, 2 recognized; total: 4 out of 5 = 80% (ML’s age: 11 years)
1995 (n = 5) 2 Spontaneously recalled, 2 recognized; total: 4 out of 5 = 80%
1996 (n = 5) 2 Spontaneously recalled, 2 recognized; total: 4 out of 5 = 80%
1997 (n = 7) 2 Spontaneously recalled, 1 recognized; total: 3 out of 7 = 43%
1998 (n = 5) 3 Spontaneously recalled, 2 recognized; total: 5 out of 5 = 100%
1999 (n = 5) 1 Spontaneously recalled, 3 recognized; total: 4 out of 5 = 80%
2000 (n = 7) 2 Spontaneously recalled, 2 recognized; total: 4 out of 7 = 57%
2001 (n = 6) 2 Spontaneously recalled, 2 recognized; total: 4 out of 6 = 67%
2002–2010 (n = 17) 2 Spontaneously recalled, 8 recognized; total: 10 out of 17 = 59% (ML’s age:
19–27 years)
Items altogether (n = 62) Total correct: 42 out of 62 = 67.7%
RETROGRADE MEMORY/EPISODIC OLD MEMORY
Autobiographic memory interview
(AGI)
Pre-school time
1. Autobiographical facts All existent
2. Autobiographical recollections Tells anecdotes his mother had told him, but he himself has no autobiographical
remembrances with a context of time, place, or emotion
Time period in basic school
1. Autobiographical facts All existent
2. Autobiographical recollections Tells anecdotes, but remembers no autobiographical episodes
Later time in school/youth
1. Autobiographical facts All existent
2. Autobiographical recollections One highly emotional episode is remembered (he observed his father jumping
out of the window after a fight with his mother)
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Test Result Below Low Average High Above Remark(s)
average average (PC = 25–75) average average
(PC < 16) (PC = 16–24) (PC = 76–84) (PC > 84)
Early adulthood/present life
1. Autobiographical facts All available
2. Autobiographical recollections Even after repeated asking, no autobiographical remembrances with a
context of time, place, or emotion
PROCEDURAL MEMORY AND PRIMING
Mirror reading task
1. Trial Total reading time for all 10 words/average reading speed for 2 words (=1 card)
Reading speed for procedural items 25/5 s
Reading speed for priming items 46/9.2 s
Reading speed for interference items 16/3.2 s
2. Trial
Reading speed for procedural items 15/3 s
Reading speed for priming items 19/7.2 s
Reading speed for interference items 36/3.8 s
Total scores (difference scores)
Procedural memory 10/2 s
Priming 27/5.4 s
Interference −20/−4 s
Errors
1. Trial 0 Errors
2. Trial 2 Errors (1 priming word, 1 interference word)
PRIMING
Gollin incomplete figures 1. Trial – average number of needed pictures: 6.3 out of 10
2. Trial – average number of needed pictures: 4.45 out of 10
PROSPECTIVE MEMORY
Rivermead behavioral memory test Impaired; see text for details
Grasshopper and Geese prospective
memory test
Severely impaired; see text for details
ATTENTION/COGNITIVE PROCESSING SPEED
TMT-A PC = 76 X
Alertness (TAP1)
Without warning signal PC = 42 X
With warning signal PC = 62 X
Phasic alertness PC = 76 X
FWIT/CWIT
Color naming T = 45 X
Color word reading T = 44− 45 X
ATTENTION/SELECTIVE ATTENTION
Go-no go (TAP1)
Reaction speed PC = 46 X
Omissions PC > 40 X 0 Omissions
Errors PC > 38 X 0 Errors
ATTENTION/DIVIDED ATTENTION
Divided attention (TAP1)
Reaction speed PC = 42 X
Omissions PC > 66 X 0 Omissions
Errors PC > 66 X 0 Errors
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Test Result Below Low Average High Above Remark(s)
average average (PC = 25–75) average average
(PC < 16) (PC = 16–24) (PC = 76–84) (PC > 84)
ATTENTION/COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY
TMT-B PC = 82–84 X
Attention switch (TAP1)
Reaction speed PC = 84 X
Errors PC < 50 X 3 Errors
FWIT/CWIT
Interference trial T = 49 X
VISUO-CONSTRUCTIVE SKILLS
Rey-Osterrieth figure
Copy PC = 58–62 X Correct and detailed
copy
Mosaic test score = 19 X No errors
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
Word fluency
FAS-test
Verbal abstraction ability PC = 12–13 X
Finding of commonalities (HAWIE-R) Score = 11 X
Action planning
Tower of Hanoi
3 Disks
1. Trial Aborted Problem definition
identified; analytic
approach; no
tendency towards
errors; own errors
recognized and
thereafter immediate
change of strategy
2. Trial 7 Steps X
4 Disks
1. Trial 22 Steps
2. Trial 15 Steps X
Burgau’s little verbal planning test
Time needed and assistance 4/4 Points X Autonomous start;
action without
assistance; time
needed: <5min
Goal reached 4/4 Points X All errands correctly
classified, 1 error
which was corrected
spontaneously
Problem solving/concept
comprehension
Mosaic test Score = 19 X
WCST2 X No problems,
understood the
principle of the test
even prior to starting
with it
Correct responses 36
Errors 0
Perseverations 0
California card sorting test X
Number of sortings 8 No problems, normal
Time 4min, 20 s
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Test Result Below Low Average High Above Remark(s)
average average (PC = 25–75) average average
(PC < 16) (PC = 16–24) (PC = 76–84) (PC > 84)
Cronin-Golomb test
Abstract concepts 5/8 Correct X
Concrete concepts 8/9 Correct X
Altogether 13/17 Correct X
Cognitive estimation
TkS3 8/16 Points X
Size 4/4 Impaired
Weight 1/4
Number 2/4
Time 1/4
Risk taking behavior
Game of dice task
Risky decisions 5 X No tendency for risky
decisions
Safe decisions 13 X
SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING TESTS: PERCEPTION OF EMOTIONAL AND COGNITIVE STATES, INTERPERSONAL SITUATIONS
Reading the mind in the eyes test 16/24 Points X Low normal to
impaired (M = 19,
SD = 2.7)
Multiple-Choice-ToM-Test (MCTT) 15/16 Points X Normal; 1 item “too
positive”
Movie for the Assessment of Social X Slightly impaired
Cognition (MASC)
Correct 32
Exaggerated ToM 5
Reduced ToM 6
No ToM 2
Tübingen (Florida) affect battery
Faces subtests Comparison scores,
healthy Ss4 (n = 12)
Face discrimination 100% X M = 98.8, SD = 2.7
Affect discrimination 93.3% X M = 91.6, SD = 5.6
Affect naming 86.6% X M = 94.8, SD = 5.6
Affect selection 100% X M = 96.5, SD = 3.7
Affect matching 86.6% X M = 94.3, SD = 5.3
Prosody subtests
Discrimination of linguistic prosody 100% X M = 100, SD = 0
Discrimination of affective prosody 93.3% X M = 100, SD = 0
Affective prosody naming 86.6% X M = 94.9, SD = 7.6
Incongruent affective prosody
Congruent 100% X M = 98.0, SD = 4.7
Incongruent 84% X M = 94.1, SD = 6.2
Intermodal subtests
Matching of affective prosody to
emotional face expression
100% X M = 95.5, SD = 6.6
Matching of emotional face expressions
to affective prosody
93.3% X M = 97.7, SD = 3.4
PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LOAD SCREENINGTESTS/SCALES
BDI-II 4 Points No hint of
depressive
symptomatology
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Test Result Below Low Average High Above Remark(s)
average average (PC = 25–75) average average
(PC < 16) (PC = 16–24) (PC = 76–84) (PC > 84)
SCL-R
Scales
Somatization T = 35 X
Obsessive-compulsiveness T = 48 X
Interpersonal sensitivity T = 36 X
Depressive tendencies T = 48 X
Anxiety T = 39 X
Anger/hostility T = 40 X
Phobic anxiety T = 45 X
Paranoid thinking T = 40 X
Psychoticism T = 42 X
Global Indices
GSI (global severity index) T = 35 X
PSDI (positive symptom distress index) T = 39 X
PST (positive symptom total) T = 37 X
FPI-R
Scales
Life satisfaction Stanine = 1 X
Social orientation Stanine = 4 X
Achievement motivation Stanine = 3 X
Inhibition Stanine = 6 X
Excitability Stanine = 4 X
Aggressiveness Stanine = 2 X
Stress Stanine = 4 X
Physical complaints Stanine = 2 X
Health worries Stanine = 4 X
Openness Stanine = 2 X
Extraversion Stanine = 2 X
Neuroticism Stanine = 4 X
Toronto-Alexithymia-Scale
Scales
Difficulties in the identification of
feelings
PR = 14 X
Difficulties in the description of feelings PR = 40 X
Externally oriented style of thinking PR = 12 X
Total score
Alexithymia PR = 8 X
EWL-N (Personal adjectives list) See text
AUTISM/EMPATHY SCALES
Autism-spectrum-quotient AQ = 15 X M = 16.4; no indices
for autistic tendencies
Cambridge Behaviour Scale
(empathy-quotient)
EQ = 53 X High average (males:
M = 41.8, SD = 11.2)
Saarbrücken personality
questionnaire (interpersonal
reactivity index)
Scales
Empathy Score = 96 X M = 100, SD = 10
Phantasy Score = 90 X
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Test Result Below Low Average High Above Remark(s)
average average (PC = 25–75) average average
(PC < 16) (PC = 16–24) (PC = 76–84) (PC > 84)
Perspective taking Score = 104 X
Personal distress Score = 85 X
ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS OF SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
Humor processing (cartoons)
ToM cartoons (n = 10)
Average processing time (s) M = 10.8s, SD = 12.37s, MD = 6 s; range: 4–43 s
Subjective judgment Humorous/funny: 5, not humorous/not funny: 2, undecided: 3
Non-ToM cartoons (n = 10)
Average processing time (s) M = 11.1 s, SD = 11.19s, MD = 5 s, range = 4–32 s
Subjective judgment Humorous/funny: 3, not humorous/not funny: 1, undecided: 6
Ultimatum game variant (responder:
ML)
Offers (starting capital 100€)
10 € Accepted
1 € Accepted
100 € Accepted
Dictator game variant (starting capital
100€)
Offer made by ML 15€
Approachability task (42
photographs)
More positive faces (n = 21) (range: ±2)
Never to approach 0
Likely to not approach 0
May be 0
Likely to approach 7
Definitely to approach 14
Rating of positive faces 1.66 (Bellugi et al., 1999: healthy subjects: M = 0.84, SD = 1.12;
Williams syndrome = 1.32, SD = 1.1)
More negative faces (n = 21)
Never to approach 0
Likely to not approach 4
May be 4
Likely to approach 6
Definitely to approach 7
Mean rating negative faces 0.76 (Bellugi et al., 1999: healthy subjects: M = −0.96, SD = 0.96;
Williams syndrome: M = −0.54, SD = 1.39)
Animation of Heider and Simmel
(1944)
Immediate free recall 83 words, reference group5 (n = 40): M = 97.5, range = 39–199 words
Use of animate nouns No, reference group5: use of animate nouns 32.5%, use of geometrical
figures: 67.5%
Description of internal states No, reference group5: description of internal states was used by 22.5%
of all reference group5 subjects
Use of animate verbs Yes (fleeing, destroying), reference group5: equal use of animate (39
subjects) and non-animate verbs (38 subjects)
Use of physical verbs Yes
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Test Result Below Low Average High Above Remark(s)
average average (PC = 25–75) average average
(PC < 16) (PC = 16–24) (PC = 76–84) (PC > 84)
MALINGERINGTENDENCIES6/EFFORT
Rey-memory-test 11 Out of 15 X Cut-off: 8
Bremen auditory memory test7 8 Out of 15 X Cut-off: 12
Test for assessing memory ability in
everyday life8
11 Out of 15 X Cut-off: 12
1TAP, Testbatterie zur Aufmerksamkeitsprüfung (Test Battery for the Assessment of Attention).
2WCST Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.
3TkS, Test für kognitives Schätzen (Test of Cognitive Estimation).
4Ss, subjects (Breitenstein et al., 1996)
5Replication study: Curci-Marino et al. (2004).
6Though ML partly showed results in tests of malingering which were indicative of malingering, these cannot be interpreted as malingering as he was usually poor
in memory recall in general.
7Bremer Auditiver Gedächtnistest.
8Test zur Überprüfung der Gedächtnisfähigkeit im Alltag.
A T-score is a standard score that sets the mean to fifty and standard deviation to 10.
A percentile (PC) is the value of a variable below which a certain percent of observation fall.
Stanines are standard scores with a maximum of 9. Stanines 1–2 and 8–9 indicate significant deviations from normative data.
Stanines 1–3 on the subscale “Openness” of the FPI-R indicate elevated social desirability limiting the validity of the responses in the entire questionnaire. The gray
column in the middle reflects average or normal scores.
the lateral ventricles and of the external cerebrospinal fluid space
(increased sulcal cerebrospinal fluid). Hippocampal changes were
not described and no comment was made about the significance of
the enlargement of the lateral ventricles.
Over the years ML attended several therapies and he grad-
uated from a special needs school. ML completed 10 years of
schooling, repeating one school year. His school trajectory might
therefore seem different than that of other patients with devel-
opmental amnesia described in the literature, who were reported
to have attended mainstream schools (“albeit with considerable
difficulties in some cases”) (Gadian et al., 2000, p. 505) (but, see
also Bindschaedler et al., 2011). Incidentally, Picard et al. (2012)
recently published two case reports of patients whom they diag-
nosed with developmental amnesia. One of those patients showed
an atypical schooling pathway; she failed normal schooling and
similarly to ML, she subsequently attended specialized school.
Since age 20ML has received external help from a caretaker
regarding planning, remembering important appointment dates,
and managing finances. He has lived in a supervised setting since
finishing school. ML’s living situation again points to a difference
between ML and other cases of developmental amnesia (Rabin
et al., 2012). However it is worth mentioning that other patients
with diagnoses of developmental amnesia were described to live
in “protective environments” (though not in residential settings)
(Picard et al., 2012). In contrast to his everyday memory impair-
ments, ML has shown impressive special knowledge in some
fields, which he has no problem to acquire and retrieve. He for
example, has a very broad and detailed knowledge of special lux-
ury goods such as watches and car brands. Furthermore, he can
learn and remember very well pieces of music. ML joined a dance
course 4 years prior to his assessment in our clinic. His substitute
decision maker states that ML is a very good dancer and has
an incredible ability to learn new forms of dancing. Similarly to
other patients with amnesia after adult or early-onset hippocam-
pal damage (Milner et al., 1968; Rabin et al., 2012), ML is aware
of his memory impairment; he has learned to partially compen-
sate for it by using strategies such as repetition and reliance on
calendars to keep track of scheduled appointments.
On an interpersonal level ML’s ability to interact with his peers
has significantly improved since his school years. His substitute
decision maker however voiced concerns about ML’s heightened
capacity to trust other people. In spite of being repeatedly told not
to give money to other people (and carrying in his portemonnaie
a visible note stating that), ML has continued to lend money to
people without usually getting it back.
IMAGING FINDINGS
ML underwent several structural MRI at different locations. The
most recent imaging was performed when ML was age 29 years,
with a 3-Tesla MRI scanner (Siemens Magneto Verio whole-body
MRI system equipped with a head volume coil). The procedure
was undergone in a neuroradiological center specialized for assess-
ing patients with epilepsy pre- and post-operatively. The imaging
data were evaluated by a neurologist with expertise in neuro-
radiology (Friedrich G. Woermann). Visual inspection revealed
grossly reduced (gray matter) density within hippocampi bilater-
ally (Figures 1 and 2). There was no evidence of pathology in the
underlying parahippocampal region or other brain regions based
on visual inspection. Using voxel-based morphometry (VBM;
SPM8, Wellcome Institute, London, UK), a quantitative compari-
son of 3D T1-weighted images of patient ML with 10 age-matched
healthy control participants was performed (for details regarding
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the method employed here, please refer to Labudda et al., 2012).
The hypothesis-driven comparison within a hippocampal vol-
ume of interest demonstrated a marked reduction of gray matter
volume within both hippocampi of the patient ML [p < 0.05,
Familywise Error (FWE)], with an anterior and right-sided pre-
ponderance. Only when using a whole brain analysis with a
less conservative statistical threshold (p < 0.001, uncorrected), we
FIGURE 1 | Bilateral hippocampal atrophy in ML with T1-weighted
images [(A) coronal; (C) axial; (D) sagittal] demonstrating reduced
hippocampal size in all directions – in the absence of marked
extrahippocampal atrophy; T2 weighted coronal image (B)
demonstrating bilateral loss of internal structure – here: a further
marker of bilateral hippocampal atrophy. On clinical MRIs left side of the
image is right side of the patient.
evidenced indices of further reductions of gray matter, affecting
both amygdalae and basal ganglia (striatum, pallidum) – with a
right-sided preponderance as well and pulvinar (bilaterally, but
with a right-sided trend).
TESTS
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
The following tests were administered:
• Standardized tests for handedness and brain lateralization
The Lateral Preference Inventory (LPI) for measurement of
handedness, footedness, earedness, and eyedness (Ehrenstein
and Arnold-Schulz-Gahmen, 1997), and the Questionnaire for
measuring motor asymmetry (Reiss and Reiss, 2000). This last
test contains 12 queries for assessing handedness and footedness.
• Standardized tests for the estimation of intelligence and overall
cognitive status
Abbreviated Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test-Revised (Block
test and Picture Completion test) (Dahl, 1972). MWT-B
or Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenztest-B (Lehrl, 2005), a
German version of the National Adult Reading Test NART
(Nelson, 1982). The reasoning and rule recognition subtest from
Leistungsprüfungssystem (LPS-4; Horn, 1983). The Mosaic Test
from the revised Hamburg Wechsler Intelligence Test (HAWIE-
R; Tewes, 1991), a German-language adaptation of the Wechsler
Intelligence Test for Adults-Revised (WAIS-R) (Wechsler, 1981).
Matrices Test from Wechsler Intelligence test for Adults (Aster
et al., 2006). Commonalities finding test fromHAWIE-R (Tewes,
1991).
• Standardized tests for the evaluation of attention, concentration,
and processing speed
Trail Making Test A and B (TMT-A + TMT-B; Lezak, 1995;
Reitan, 1958); Attention Index of the German version of the
Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (WMS-R; Härting et al., 2000);
FIGURE 2 | Quantitative comparison of 3D T1-weighted images of
patient ML with 10 age-matched control subjects using voxel-based
morphometry (VBM; SPM8, Wellcome Institute, London, UK). For
details regarding the method used here, please refer to Labudda et al.
(2012). (A) Hypothesis-driven comparison within a hippocampal volume
of interest demonstrates a marked reduction of gray matter volume
within both hippocampi of the patient (p < 0.05, FWE) which has an
anterior and right-sided preponderance (please note that in SPM the
right side of the picture is the right side of the patient – see
crosshair ). (B) Using a whole brain analysis with a less conservative
statistical threshold (p < 0.001, uncorrected), there are further reductions
of gray matter, affecting amygdalae (bilaterally), bilateral dorsal striatum
(mainly caudate and putamen, and to a certain extent the globus
pallidus), portions of the ventral striatum (bilaterally), and posterior
portions of the pulvinaris complex (also bilaterally), again with a
right-sided preponderance.
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the subtests Alertness, Selective Attention, andDivided Attention
of the Test Battery for the Assessment of Attention or Testbatterie
zur Aufmerksamkeitsprüfung (TAP) (Fimm and Zimmermann,
2001). The TAP is a computer-based test that assesses attentional
performance based on reaction times. The Alertness subtest
provides a measure of general slowing. The Selective Attention
subtest is a go/no-go task, during which the participant has to
selectively react to a group of stimuli, but not to others, and to
inhibit a dominant response. The Divided Attention subtest is a
“dual task” paradigm that assesses the ability to flexibly switch
attention between two ongoing tasks (Fujiwara et al., 2008).
• Standardized tests for evaluation of short-term memory and
working memory
WechslerMemory Scale-Revised; digit span and block span for-
ward and backward; adaptive digit ordering test (Hoppe et al.,
2000). In this last test digits which are presented in random
order have to be recalled in ascending order (e.g., 4–3–9–3
should be recalled as 3–3–4–9).
• Standardized tests for the evaluation of constructional functions
and planning
Copy administration of the Rey-Osterrieth Figure Test
(Osterrieth, 1944; Lezak, 1995); Benton Visual Retention Test
(Lezak, 1995; Spreen and Strauss, 1998); Burgau Little Verbal
Planning Test (Burgauer Kleiner Verbaler Planungstest; von
Cramon and Zihl, 2012); Test of Cognitive Estimation (TkS;
Brand et al., 2002, 2003a,b). The Benton Visual Retention Test
taps on many different abilities such as visuo-spatial perception,
visual and verbal conceptualizations, and working memory at
the border to long-term memory. The Burgau Test requires the
planning of a time-based sequence in which several transactions
(going shopping) have to be organized within a given time. The
TkS is a German-language test for cognitive estimation (Shallice
and Evans, 1978), during which participants are requested to
estimate numbers, weights, heights/lengths, and time durations.
• Standardized tests for the evaluation of the verbal and non-verbal
explicit anterograde long-term memory
Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (Härting et al., 2000); Verbal
Learning Memory Test (VLMT) (Helmstaedter et al., 2001);
Rey-Osterrieth Figure; Copy trial followed by delayed recall
after 30min (Lezak, 1995); the Doors Test (visual recognition)
of the Doors and People Test (Baddeley et al., 1994; Adlam
et al., 2009); Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test (Wilson et al.,
1985). The VLMT requires the recall of a list A of 15 pre-
sented words for 5 trials, the recall of a second (interference)
list B, then again recall of the list A, and recall of it after 30min
delay, and finally the recognition of words of list A from words
belonging to lists A and B and to none of the two. The Doors
test requires the visual recognition of 12 easily and 12 difficultly
to discriminate doors, each from an array of 4 doors. And the
RBMT contains a number of subtests assessing retrospective
and prospective visual and verbal memory functions.
• Tests for the evaluation of retrograde memory (standardized or
qualitative)
Semantic Knowledge Test [Semantic Old Memory Inventory;
Schmidtke and Vollmer-Schmolck, 1999 (qualitative descrip-
tion)]; Bielefeld Autobiographical Memory Interview (BAGI;
standardized; partly based on the Autobiographical Memory
Interview of Kopelman et al., 1990; Fujiwara, 2004; Fujiwara
et al., 2008; Fast et al., 2013; Famous Faces Test; standard-
ized; see Jänicke, 2001), Famous Terms, Famous Events and
Famous Names Tests [(qualitative descriptions); Leplow and
Dierks, 1997; Markowitsch, 2003; Fujiwara et al., 2008]. In
the Semantic Knowledge Test general facts are asked (“What
is the currency in Switzerland?”), in the BAGI two episodes
with time, place, emotional involvement are requested from all
periods of the past life, divided into 5- or 10-year epochs.
• Test for evaluation of prospective memory – qualitative descrip-
tion (Knight et al., 2010; Staniloiu and Markowitsch, 2012).
Recalling to perform an intended future action, in particular to
ask at the end of the testing for a personal object that the exam-
iner had borrowed from the patient and hid in the examining
room, in response to a pre-specified cue, namely the end of
the testing. “The Grasshoppers and Geese Prospective Memory
Test” (Lanting et al., 2010, 2011), which was developed for eth-
nically diverse individuals, comprises a task instruction that
is embedded semantically. The test requests that the patient
reminds the examiner to perform a task when an external (ver-
bal) cue is delivered. If the patient does not respond to the cue,
a series of three verbal prompts are provided. Scores range from
0 (no prompts required) to 4 (no recall to perform the action
after all three prompts).
• Tests for the evaluation of priming (standardized) and procedural
memory (qualitative description)
Mirror Reading Test (von Cramon et al., 1993; Borsutzky et al.,
2008, 2010), Gollin Incomplete Pictures Test (Gollin, 1960;
Markowitsch et al., 1993; von Cramon et al., 1993).
For the Mirror Reading Test the version that is described in
Borsutzky et al. (2008, 2010) was used. This variant allows a differ-
entiation between priming and procedural memory. It comprises
a series of 15 cards each consisting of two German words in mir-
ror writing (30 words in total, all words with 8 to 10 letters) which
are visually presented to the participants. Participants are asked to
read the words as quickly and accurately as possible. Upon correct
reading of the two words of one card, the next card is presented.
The time by which subjects read both words correctly, constitutes
the reading time measure. If they read a word incorrectly, they
are told so. However, the correct word is not provided. In addi-
tion, all incorrect responses are counted. After a delay of 30min
a surprise second trial is administered. Herein, 10 words (on five
cards) are identical with the first trial, 10 words are new and 10
words are also new, but similar in orthography to 10 words of trial
1 (e.g., “Explosion” and “Exkursion”). The sequence of cards is
randomized for both trials. Improvement in reading speed from
trial 1 to trial 2 of the recurring words serves to measure prim-
ing performance (“Priming”). Improvement in reading time of
new words is used for an index of skill acquisition, i.e., procedu-
ral learning (“Procedural Memory”). Those words of trial 2 that
are orthographically similar to words of trial 1 (“Interference”) are
created to induce interference in reading. We assume that due to
these similarities in orthography with the words of trial 1, sub-
jects might be disturbed in automatic reading processes. In trial
2 participants may initially tend to recognize the similarly look-
ing words of trial 1 due to priming effects, but during reading,
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they would notice most discrepancies and would then have to exe-
cute a more effortful analysis. On the one hand, this may lead to
longer reading times. On the other hand, if subjects experience
deficits in suppressing the activated, but irrelevant memory trace
(i.e., the “Interference” words of trial 1), they may produce more
mistakes in reading of “Interference” words in trial 2 compared to
“Priming” and “Procedural Memory” items.
In the Gollin Incomplete Pictures Test 20 pictures are pre-
sented, each picture containing a single familiar item (tree, ship,
rabbit, etc.). Each item is given in 10 versions from a barely sug-
gestive drawing (just a few dots or line drawings) to complete
figure drawing. The participant has to tell what he or she thinks is
to be seen in the drawing. Usually healthy participants recognize
the item between versions 5 and 6, when given the first time, but
much earlier (version 2 or 3), when it is given the second time.
• Tests for the assessment of executive functions, problem solving,
and cognitive flexibility
Trail Making Test-B (Lezak, 1995); Tower of Hanoi (Borys et al.,
1982; Spitz et al., 1982; Lezak, 1995);CaliforniaCard SortingTest
(Delis et al., 1987, 1992); problemsolving test ofCronin-Golomb
et al. (1987a,b); Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Nelson, 1976);
Game of Dice Task (Brand et al., 2005; Brand and Markowitsch,
2010). (All tests but the problem solving test of Cronin-Golomb
are standardized.) In the problem solving test participants are
given 17 sheets of paper, one after another; each sheet shows a
drawing on the left side of the paper and three drawings on the
right side (e.g., a crescentmoon on the left side and a penguin, a
woodpecker,andanowlontheright side).Theparticipantshould
tell which of the three drawings on the right side best matches
the drawing on the left side; we provide a qualitative description
of performance on this test.
The Game of Dice Task is presented via computer. It is a fic-
titious gambling situation with explicit rules for virtual gains,
losses, and winning strategies, which assesses decision-making
under risk. A virtual single dice and a shaker are employed. Before
throwing the virtual dice for 18 times, participants each time have
to choose a single or a combination of 2, 3, or 4 numbers. Each
choice is associated with different gains or losses. Participants get
visual and acoustic feedback for their former decision.
• Standardized tests of verbal fluency
Controlled Oral Word Association Test [COW fluency tasks
(FAS); Golden et al., 2002]; Supermarket task (word pro-
duction) (Calabrese and Kessler, 2000); Boston Naming Test
(Kaplan et al., 1983; Lezak, 1995; Spreen and Strauss, 1998;
Golden et al., 2002); the German version of the Stroop Test
(Farbe-Wort-Interferenz Test/FWIT; or CWIT for Color Word
Interference Test; Stroop, 1935; Bäumler, 1985).
• Standardized tests for calculation
Zahlenverarbeitungs- und Rechentest (ZRT; Kalbe et al., 2002).
In this test various simple and more complex calculations have
to be done (additions, subtractions, multiplications, divisions).
• Standardized tests for evaluation of malingering tendencies
Tests of memory malingering/effort [Rey 15-Item-Test (Lezak,
1995); tests from the Test Battery for Forensic Neuropsychology
(TBFN; Bremer Auditory Memory Test; Test for Assessing
Memory Ability in Everyday Life) (Heubrock and Petermann,
2000)]. In the TBFN subjects listen to a number of sounds
(e.g., cackling of geese, honking) and later have to name them,
or they listen to statements and later get for each statement
a choice of four alternatives what was said (e.g., whether a
meeting was at 10, 12, 2, or 4 o’clock).
• Tests for evaluation of emotional processing
Florida Affect Battery (translated as Tübingen Affect Battery;
Bowers et al., 1991; Breitenstein et al., 1996; standardized test);
Emotional Pictures Test (von Cramon et al., 1993; perfor-
mance on this test was qualitatively compared with the
performance of the healthy control group and patient HI
with septal nuclei damage described in von Cramon et al.,
1993); Picture Story for Affect Induction (BAd; Temizyürek,
2003; qualitative description); Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(SaarbrückerPersönlichkeitsfragebogen/SaarbrückenPersonality
Questionnaire; standardized; Beven et al., 2004; Paulus, 2012).
In the Emotional Pictures Test 40 photographs with scenes of a
neutral, positive, or negative content (e.g., shooting at a person,
kissing another person) are presented and after half an hour the
40 original pictures had to be recognized out of 80 photographs.
Controlhealthyparticipants (vonCramonet al., 1993)performed
at a level of 95% correct for emotional and 88.3% correct for
neutral pictures in the Emotional Pictures Test.
In the BAd two versions of a story about a family (mother,
father, child) are shown – in the neutral version a day in their
life is shown in pictures without that the child is involved in a car
accident; in the emotional version the child is involved in a car
accident. While watching the pictures the participant also listens
to a male voice providing a narrative for each picture. The two
variants of the story are identical for the first and last third of the
pictures, but differ for the second third.
• Standardized tests for mood, personality and psychopathological,
and psychological load screening
Beck Depression Interview-II (BDI-II; Hautzinger et al.,
2006); The Symptom Checklist Revised or SCL-90R (Hessel
et al., 2001); Freiburg-Personality-Inventory-Revised (FPI-R;
Fahrenberg et al., 2001); The German version of the Toronto-
Alexithymia-Scale (Kupfer et al., 2001); Autism-Spectrum-
Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2006); Cambridge Behavior
Scale (de Haen, 2006); Eigenschaftswörterliste EWL-N (List
of personal adjectives) (Janke and Debus, 1978). The SCL-
90R assesses psychiatric symptom load and psychological dis-
tress. It has nine subscales, such as somatization, obsessive-
compulsiveness, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety,
anger-hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid thinking, and psy-
choticism. The general psychological distress level is estimated
based on a global severity index, which is derived from all sub-
scales. The FPI-R provides an assessment of personality along 12
dimensions: life satisfaction, social orientation, motivation to
achieve, inhibition, excitability, aggressiveness, stress, physical
complaints, health worries, openness, extraversion, and neu-
roticism. The EWL-N is a multidimensional self-administered
scale, describing the actual well-being. It contains 15 subscales,
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assessing activity, concentration, passivity, fatigue, extraversion,
introversion, self-confidence,mood elevation, excitability, inter-
personal sensitivity, irritability, anxiety, depressive tendency,
dreaminess, and numbness. The scale was given to both ML
and his mother who were both requested to choose the personal
adjectives that matched ML’s characteristics best.
• Standardized test for visual perception
Judgment of Line Orientation (Lezak, 1995; Mitrushina et al.,
2005).
• Tests for social information processing
Tests for social perception (perception of face, speech perception)
“Tübinger Affekt Batterie,” a German-language version of the
Florida Affect Battery (Bowers et al., 1991; Breitenstein et al.,
1996) was administered.
Tests for social cognition (theory of mind, empathy)
“Augen-ToM-Test,” a 24 photographs containing German adap-
tation of the well-known RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Fleck
et al., 2002; Reinhold and Markowitsch, 2007; Fujiwara et al.,
2008) was administered (for a detailed description of the version
of this test, see Dziobek et al., 2006). During the task only the eye
regions of female (12) andmale (12) faces are presented. The par-
ticipant has to choose one of the four verbal descriptors (words)
that she or he thinks it describes the best the mental state of the
character. For a comparison group, we referred to age and educa-
tional matched data from Reinhold and Markowitsch (2007) and
Dziobek et al. (2006). Mean scores and standard deviations are
presented in Table 1.
The Multiple-Choice-ToM-Test (MCTT; Kalbe et al., 2001;
Adenauer et al., 2005) version that we used requires the partici-
pants to read 16 short stories. (The test exists in two versions, one
with 30 short written stories and another one with 16 stories. We
provide a qualitative description of the performance on the abbre-
viated version of the MCTT). After each story (see example below)
the participant has to make inferences about the mental states of
a character of the story by resorting to a forced multiple choice
format with four possible answers (only one right answer). The
multiple choice format enables differentiation of three different
types of mistakes: (a) mental states inferences that are “excessive”;
(b) mental state inferences that are “too positive”; (c) choice of the
distractor answer that reflects a neutral answer (i.e., a non-mental
state inference such as physical causation).
Example of a story fromMCTT:
Die Bananenschale (The banana skin; translated from
German):
Joseph slips on the footpath on a banana skin and falls down.
A woman close to him starts to laugh loudly. What does Joseph
think?
(1) Such a silly woman. She should keep her mouth shut.
(2) Well, she is in a good mood.
(3) She definitely smashed the banana skin purposefully to this
place.
(4) The woman wears a nice skirt.
The movie for the assessment of Social Cognition (MASC)
(Dziobek et al., 2006; Fleck, 2008) requires the participants to watch
a video about four individuals in theirmid-thirties who gather for a
dinner party. Themovie is 15min long, but it is paused and the par-
ticipants have to answer questions concerning the film characters’
emotions, thoughts and intentions. Therefore the test session lasts
around 45min. The test has been applied to healthy participants,
patients with Asperger syndrome (see Dziobek et al., 2006) and
patients with schizophrenia (Fleck, 2008). For comparison groups,
we referred to the study of Dziobek et al. (2006). Mean scores and
standard deviations are presented in Table 1.
The animation of Heider and Simmel (1944); Lück (2006),
and Curci-Marino et al. (2004). The animated and silent short
movie created by Heider and Simmel shows three geometrical fig-
ures (a large triangle, a small triangle and a small circle), which
are moving in the neighborhood of a rectangle. In our study, we
used a procedure similar to that of Curci-Marino et al. (2004),
who applied this test to 40 German-speaking participants (15
women and 25 men) recruited from a technical university with
a mean age of 24.3 years, in an attempt to replicate the origi-
nal results of Heider and Simmel (1944). The movie was shown
twice on a computer screen. As Heider and Simmel, we used a
general task, such as “describe in writing what you saw in the
movie.” The text produced by the participant was then analyzed in
a manner similar to that of Curci-Marino and colleagues and the
results were qualitatively compared to those obtained by Curci-
Marino and colleagues. We recorded the number of total words
used and analyzed the use of animate nouns versus nouns design-
ing geometrical figures, the description of internal states, the use
of physical verbs versus animate verbs.
Understanding humor (Happé et al., 1999; Shammi and Stuss,
1999; Stuss and Levine, 2002; Uekermann et al., 2006; Bodden
et al., 2010a) was qualitatively investigated. In the Humor task
that we used, the participant is shown 20 cartoons from pop-
ular magazines. Similarly to the design of Happe et al. (1999),
the cartoons are grouped in two conditions: 10 ToM cartoons
and 10 non-mentalistic cartoons (the latter involved a physical
anomaly). Cartoons are randomly shown, one at a time, on a
computer screen. The participant is told to look at each cartoon
and announce when he understood the joke. He then is asked to
try to explain to the experimenter why each cartoon is funny. In
addition to providing an explanation, the participant is asked to
provide a subjective funniness rating for each cartoon. The mean
times needed for processing the ToM cartoons and non-ToM
cartoons are recorded (Bodden et al., 2010a).
Tests for social cognition (social judgment)
The Approachability Task (Adolphs et al., 1998) assesses the ability
to make social judgments of other people. For this study we used an
adaptation of the original task of Adolphs et al. (1998), which had
been employed by Bellugi et al. (1999) to test 26 participants with
Williams syndrome (WMS; mean age 23.6) and 26 healthy partic-
ipants of similar age and gender ratio (mean age 25.5). Similarly
to Bellugi et al. (1999) we used 42 black and white photographs
of unfamiliar human faces, which were taken out of a pool of 100
original stimuli (Adolphs et al., 1998); 21 of these photographs
depicted faces for which normal controls had given more negative
ratings and 21 showed faces for which normal controls had given
more positive ratings. The photographs were shown to ML one at
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a time, in random order. Without time constraints, ML had to rate
the approachability of the face stimulus on a five point Likert type
scale, which ranged from −2 (very unapproachable) to +2 (very
approachable), by indicating how much he would approach and
strike up a conversation on a street with the person whose face was
depicted in the photograph. ML’s performance was qualitatively
compared to the results of Bellugi et al. (1999).
Tests for social cognition (moral judgment)
We used variations of the Ultimatum and Dictator Games which
deviated from standard tests in several respects (Koenigs and
Tranel, 2007). In the Ultimatum Game, ML acted as the respon-
der. The starting capital was 100 Euros (Bolton and Ockenfels,
1998; Vieth, 2003; Oosterbeek et al., 2004). However, in contrast
to the standard Ultimatum Game, participation was at the end of
the experiment compensated with a fixed amount regardless of
responses on the task (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007). Furthermore,
in this variation, the examiner knew the proposers’ identity and
the offers were predetermined by the experimenter (Koenigs and
Tranel, 2007). In the variation of the Ultimatum Game we used,
the starting capital was 100 Euros; again, a fixed compensation at
the end of the experiment regardless of responses on the task was
offered. ML acted as dictator, deciding howmuch of the capital to
keep. Again, the examiner knew both the identity of the “dictator”
and “recipient.”
Tests for social regulation (cognitive control, emotion regulation,
monitoring/error correction, deception)
Game of Dice Test (Brand et al., 2005; Brand and
Markowitsch, 2010); Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Saarbrücker
Persönlichkeitsfragebogen/Saarbrücken Personality Questionnaire;
Beven et al., 2004; Paulus, 2012); tests for evaluation of malinger-
ing tendencies (see above). The Game of Dice Task was described
above under tests for executive functions. The personal distress
scale of the Saarbrücken Personality Questionnaire contains
queries which tap on emotional regulation.
Prior to starting the testing process, Mr. N. was asked a series of
general interview questions, to assess for problems with awareness
and orientation.
TESTING RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
GENERAL BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS
ML came to the assessment accompanied by his surrogate deci-
sion maker. Informed written consent was obtained for the par-
ticipation in the study and publication of the report. The study
adhered to the declaration of Helsinki.
ML was eager to participate and to show what he is able to
do. In the following we will describe results from testing him over
a period of about 8 h (with breaks). A summary of ML’s testing
results is provided in Table 1.
LATERALITY
ML in general was lateralized to the right, though he used his left
hand for writing and other ways of motor performance (Laterality
Preference Inventory). In the Questionnaire for Measuring Motor
Asymmetry he provided evidence for a symmetrical foot use and
more frequent use of his left hand.
LANGUAGE ANDWORD KNOWLEDGE
ML’s knowledge of terms and words was good (Boston Naming
Test). He just failed to name asparagus and did not know the exact
terms for yoke and abacus.
VISUAL PERCEPTION
Visual perception, as tested with the Line Orientation Test, was
within normal limits.
ATTENTION, CONCENTRATION, AND PROCESSING SPEED
In all test of attention, concentration, and processing speed ML
gained at least within normal limits situated scores. In the Trail
Making Test A and B his performance was above average; test-
ing results for reaction speed and phasic alertness were indicative
of above average performance as well. Performance on divided
attention and selective attention tasks was within normal limits
(Test Battery for the Assessment of Attention or TAP). Stroop test
performance was within normal limits as well.
NUMBER CALCULATION AND ARITHMETIC
Number processing and arithmetic were perfectly normal.
INTELLIGENCE AND OVERALL COGNITIVE STATUS
Several assessment procedures were used. In a test for estimating
his verbal intelligence (MWT) ML was average. Also his perfor-
mance in finding commonalities was average. On the other hand
in non-verbal logical thinking ML was quite superior (IQ= 130).
In other non-verbal tests of IQ his performance was superior to
normal.
SHORT-TERMANDWORKING MEMORY
Performances on digit span forward and backward were above
average in both numerical and visual tests. The surprising excep-
tion was an only average performance in visual block span for-
ward (while the performance on visual block span backward was
above average). Also ML was not prone to interference.
VISUAL-CONSTRUCTIVE SKILLS
In the Copy administration of the Rey-Osterrieth Figure ML
reached points that situated his performance within normal lim-
its. In theMosaic test he was flawless.
LONG-TERMMEMORY
A large number of tests were applied to assess ML’s long-term
memory abilities. They can be divided into tests of anterograde,
retrograde, and prospective memory, episodic–autobiographical,
semantic, procedural, and primingmemory (cf. Markowitsch and
Staniloiu, 2012).
Anterograde memory
On all tests of anterograde memory, ML was below the level of
normals (the only exception was that in the interference list of
the VLMT he behaved substantially above average; this result
can, however, be interpreted as reflecting his inability to properly
acquire the main list of words, which was given prior to the inter-
ference list). Especially when it came to delayed recall of informa-
tion he scored repeatedly at percentile 0 (VLMT, Logical Memory
Subtest of theWechsler Memory Scale-Revised, and Rey-Osterrieth
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Figure, delayed recall). Also in the Benton Visual Retention Test his
performance was below average.
In more easy tasks of visual recognition he encountered much
less problems (simple doors of the Doors and People Test) (Adlam
et al., 2009). Also in recognition memory tests with emotional
material he performed sub-average, but not as poorly as in free
recall tests involving emotional material. During the Emotional
Pictures Test, ML recognized only 60% of the emotional pictures,
which places his performance far below that of the control group
described in the study of von Cramon et al. (1993). Evenmore sur-
prising was the high number (9) of falsely recognized distractors,
i.e., of pictures he had not previously seen (cf. Table 1).
With respect toML’s performance in the picture story for affect
induction (BAd), there were no differences in the free recall task
of emotional versus non-emotional variant of the story. This sug-
gests that his mnemonic performance did not benefit from the
potential emotional enhancement (Markowitsch and Staniloiu,
2011b). With respect to the recognition task of the emotional ver-
sion of the story, ML recognized 18 out of 28 details (64%) from
the first pictures (1–4), 9 out of 21 (42.8%) details from the pic-
tures presented in the middle (5–7), and only 7 out of 21 (33.3%)
details from the pictures presented at the end (8–10). The pic-
tures 5–7 are accompanied in the emotional variant of the story by
an emotional narrative delivered by a male voice, while the other
pictures are accompanied by a neutral narrative, which is identi-
cal for both the “emotional” and “neutral” versions of the story.
In the study of Temizyürek (2003) that included 30 participants
(mean age: 33.8+ 8.9 years; IQ = 108), the percentage of recog-
nized details from the “emotional” variant of the story was 83%
for the first pictures (1–4), 77% for the middle pictures (5–7),
and 72.7% for the pictures presented at the end (8–10). The lower
recognition of details from the last compared to the first part of
the story in the case of ML may reflect forgetting in the context of
cognitive overload (Corkin, 1984; Markowitsch et al., 1993).
Retrograde semantic memory recognition
In tests of retrograde semantic memory recognition ML, on
the other hand, was principally normal (Semantic Old Memory
Inventory, Famous Faces Test, Famous Names, Famous Terms, and
Famous Events Tests).
Retrograde autobiographical memory recall
As it was evident from the Autobiographical Memory Inventory,
ML was unable to recall any personal events apart from one
outstanding event, where his father made a suicide attempt by
jumping out of the window. On the other hand, he could list
autobiographical semantic facts (date of birth, place of birth,
schooling, and the like).
Prospective memory
His prospective memory appeared impaired (Rivermead
Behavioral Memory Test; “The Grasshoppers and Geese Prospective
Memory Test”). In the Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test ML
did not spontaneously recall to ask back for the loaned item. He
required several very explicit cues. After each cue he responded
“Yes, there was something,” without knowing what. When given
alternatives, he finally selected the right response.
On the Grasshoppers and Geese Prospective Memory Test ML
did not perform the required action after all three prompts.
(When extending the prompts to six – which is against instruc-
tions – he finally recalled the action he needed to perform.)
Procedural memory and priming
His procedural and priming skills appeared to be intact.
MALINGERING
Tests of malingering partly yielded results which – for an indi-
vidual with normal memory capacity – would be indicative of
malingering. As ML was quite deficient in memory recall of new
material in general, these test outcomes cannot be interpreted
as providing evidence for feigning or malingering (Sollman and
Berry, 2011).
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING ABILITIES
ML’s problem solving and executive abilities were to a large
extent within normal limits. Cognitive estimation measures were
impaired (TkS). In the TkS,ML showed similar deficits as patients
with Korsakoff ’s syndrome (Brand et al., 2003a,b). He exhib-
ited deficits in estimating dimensions “weight,” “quantity,” and
“time,” whereby time and weight estimations were the most dete-
riorated. Size estimation was normal. Deficits in the TkS time
items had been speculated to depend on timing deficits com-
bined with remote memory impairment (Brand et al., 2003a). [In
the time estimation task used here the participant was asked to
estimate the duration of specific events (e.g., duration of a morn-
ing shower) without experiencing them in the test situation itself
(Brand et al., 2003a).]
In the Concept Comprehension Test (Cronin-Golomb et al.,
1987a,b) ML’s performance was sub-average for abstract, but
within normal limits for concrete concepts (Martins et al., 2006).
Performance on verbal FAS was below average as well, resembling
other reports on patients with developmental amnesia (Temple
and Richardson, 2006).
SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING: PERCEPTION OF EMOTIONAL
AND COGNITIVE STATES AND INTERPERSONAL SITUATIONS
In the German adaptation of the RMET ML was only slightly
impaired. In terms of qualitative findings, he required a rela-
tively long time to respond. He made eight mistakes, but had
no difficulties with reading fear. He rated two female eye pairs
as belonging to a male.
In the MASC his performance was again only slightly
impaired. ML’s performance in this task seemed much closer to
that of the 20 healthy controls from the study of Dziobek et al.
(2006) (34.8 + 2.7) than to that of the 19 patients with Asperger’s
syndrome (24.4+ 5.9) from the same study (cf. Table 1).
In the Florida (Tübingen) Affect Battery ML displayed below
average performance in the more complex subtests (affect nam-
ing, affect matching, affect prosody naming, detecting incon-
gruent affect prosody, and matching face expression to affective
prosody. In the visual affect naming subtest ML incorrectly des-
ignated the emotion of “fear” as being “anger” on two occasions.
In the affect matching subtest, he made two mistakes, pertaining
to the emotions “fear” and “happy,” respectively. In the naming
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of affective prosody, he made two errors, pertaining to the emo-
tion of happiness (which he interpreted as “neutral”) and “fear.”
In the subtest requiring matching emotional faces to affective
prosody he made one mistake, which involved the emotion of
“fear.” The most impaired was his performance on incongruent
affective prosody, in which the semantic context was incongru-
ent with prosody (Breitenstein et al., 1998; Snitz et al., 2002;
Paulmann et al., 2008; Ward et al., 2012). While the degree of
impairment detected in ML’s performance should be interpreted
with caution given the well-known ceiling effects of the Florida
Battery Test, the qualitative description of these impairments is
intriguing, when it is corroborated with findings from other tests,
such as the Approachability Task or EWL-N (see below).
OTHER TESTS OF SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
The results in the Humor Appreciation Test (cartoons) were
ambivalent. In the variation of Ultimatum Game ML accepted all
the offers, including theminimal value (1 Euro) and in theDictator
Game he offered 15 Euros, which represents 15% of the starting
capital. Although this behavior is difficult to be accurately inter-
preted due to the non-standardized format of testing that we used,
there are, in our opinion some hints of abnormal fairness attitudes
(Scheele et al., 2012; Baumard et al., 2013). Incidentally abnormal
fairness attitudes and socio-economical decisions have recently
been related to amygdala dysfunction (Scheele et al., 2012).
Results of the Approachability Task are indicative of either
heightened capacity for trust, or hypersociability (see Bellugi et
al., 1999; Martens et al., 2009), or alternatively, decreased aversive-
ness (such as in patients with amygdala damage; Adolphs et al.,
1998, 1999). In the task of Heider and Simmel, ML used a total
of 83 words in his description, within the range of healthy par-
ticipants (Curci-Marino et al., 2004). However, he did not use
any animate noun and gave no description of internal states. This
finding is interesting in the light of data from Curci-Marino et al.
(2004). This study (which was conducted in a technical univer-
sity and without any explicit indication that it was a psychological
study) failed to replicate several findings of Heider and Simmel
(1944). The latter had reported a high use of animate nouns in
their sample (97.1%). In the sample of Curci-Marino et al. (2004),
27 (59.3% men) out of 40 participants (67.5%, p < 0.05) did not
use any animate nouns; only 13 participants out of 40 did use ani-
mate nouns (32.5%). The description of internal states was done
by nine participants (22.5%, p < 0.01). Out of these participants
six were men. Physical verbs were used by 39 participants and
38 participants described the moves of the figures with animated
verbs among others. In contrast to Curci-Marino et al. (2004), the
administration of the animation task of Heider and Simmel was
done in our study as part of the psychological testing, which in
theory could have offered ML a performance advantage.
PSYCHIATRIC RATINGS, EMOTIONS, AND PERSONALITY
The screening instrument Beck Depression Inventory did not yield
scores suggestive of an affective disorder. ML did not show autistic
tendencies (Autism-Spectrum-Quotient). In the Symptom Check
List (SCL-90R) ML reported little tendency to somatize his prob-
lems, denied uncertainty in social situations or experiencing
feelings of anxiety or inadequacy. In the FPI-R,ML answered that
he had reduced life satisfaction, few physical complaints, very lit-
tle aggressiveness, and perceived himself as being reserved and
introverted. He experienced himself as being passive and with
decreased motivation for achievement. On the openness subscale
of FPI-R,ML scored significantly lower than his age group, seem-
ing therefore to be very concerned with social conventions and
social desirability. The subscale “openness” (willingness to admit
minor weaknesses and violations of everyday conventions versus
orientation toward making a socially desirable impression/social
norms) of the FPI-R acts as a validity scale. Low results on this
sub-scale point to socially desirable response tendencies. If a low
result (stanines one to three) is reached in this subscale, inter-
pretation of all other responses is limited (Fahrenberg et al.,
2001; Fujiwara et al., 2008). According to findings from the self
administration of Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-26) ML did not
experience any kind of difficulties with perceiving his own feelings
and their accompanying bodily sensations. He scored low on the
subscale for external orienting thinking style and perceived him-
self as being very interested in finding solutions in problematic
situations. According to his self assessment, his ability to describe
his own feelings was within normal limits. Given the deficient per-
formance ofML on some tasks that objectively assessed emotional
processing, one might argue that the results from self-evaluation
scales or inventories should be interpreted cautiously. This is one
of the reasons why we chose to ask both ML and his mother
to complete the personal adjectives self-questionnaire (EWL-N).
Both the mother and the patient confirmed that ML experienced
no fear and no aggression. Out of 161 adjectives, 33 were judged
differently by the two. ML’s mother perceived ML as having no
symptoms of depression and ML denied feeling depressed. While
ML’s mother perceived ML as being unconcentrated, undecided,
and contemplative, ML viewed himself as being well concen-
trated, capable of decision making, and rejected all adjectives
describing a contemplative or daydreaming nature. We speculate
that ML’s mother’s perception of ML as being non-concentrated
and a daydreamer might represent a misinterpretation of his
memory difficulties (Gadian et al., 2000).
ML’s capacity for empathy appeared even above average as
assessed by one scale (Cambridge Behavior Scale). In the Saar-
brücken Personality Questionnaire the only deviant scale score
was that for personal distress. With a score of 85 on the latter
scale ML supposedly experiences a lower (below average) level
of personal distress (self oriented unpleasant feelings) when he is
confronted with the distress of others. This scale’s queries tap on
aspects of emotional regulation. The low level of personal distress
when confronted with the distress of others may also be corrob-
orated with ML’s view of himself as being interested in finding
solutions in problematic situations. This pro-active attitude may
be fueled by a decreased level of aversiveness or of conscious
fear when confronted with various extreme situations, includ-
ing the distress of others, which may be related to an amygdala
dysfunction. Personal distress elicited by the distress of others
is a self oriented motivated response directed toward self regu-
lation of overarousal, which may be associated with fearfulness
and emotional vulnerability (Cheetham et al., 2009). Too much
personal distress might hinder the capacity for empathic con-
cern; the amygdala and its connections seem to modulate the
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balance between the two (Feinstein et al., 2011; Roth-Hanania
et al., 2011). The decreased level of aversiveness (probably due
to an amygdalar dysfunction) may also account for the results on
the approachability task, which were discussed above and for the
behavior during administered variations of the economic games.
ML’s scores on the fantasy scale, perspective-taking scale, and
empathic concern scale fell within the average range (90–110),
with the highest score (104) being achieved on the perspective-
taking scale. Findings of average scores on the fantasy scale
support its relationship with measures of verbal intelligence
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). The perspective-taking scale was
repeatedly related to interpersonal functioning, increased self
esteem and social competence (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009).
The conduction of a psychiatric interview in conformity with
DSM-IV-TR (2000) did not provide evidence of meeting full
diagnostic criteria for a concomitant major depressive disorder,
dysthymic disorder, or bipolar disorder (or other psychiatric dis-
order, with the exception of adjustment disorder). No substance
use disorder was diagnosed. ML did not meet diagnostic criteria
for a pervasive developmental disorder. [However, in line with the
results of a new small study showing that some individuals with
autism spectrum disorder may lose their diagnosis, one could
argue that ML might have outgrown a range of symptoms later
on (Fein et al., 2013).]
DISCUSSION
According to our knowledge, this is one of the first reports about
a comprehensive evaluation of social information processing in
a patient with amnesia with neurodevelopmental mechanisms
(probable developmental amnesia). ML has a long standing his-
tory of difficulties with acquiring EAMs for long-term storage and
with everydaymemory performance (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997,
2003; Willoughby et al., 2012). These impairments occurred in
the context of postnatal hypoxia and reduced hippocampal forma-
tion volumes bilaterally. The reduction in hippocampal volumes
likely happened due to the hypoxic incident; as mentioned above,
a bilateral enlargement of the lateral ventricles (which suggests hip-
pocampal volume reductions; Calabrese and Penner, 2007) had
been noted more than 10 years prior to ML’s most recent MRI
imaging. Our voxel-basedmorphometry data confirmedmarkedly
reduced gray-matter density within the hippocampus bilaterally,
with an anterior and right-sided preponderance. Only when we
used a whole brain analysis with a less conservative statistical
threshold (p < 0.001, uncorrected), we identified further regions
showing reductions of gray matter, such as both amygdalae and
bilateral striatum and pallidum, bilateral thalamus (pulvinar) –
again with a right-sided preponderance. Our findings partly over-
lap with the voxel-based morphometry results of Vargha-Khadem
et al. (2003). One potentially intriguing result in our study is the
reduction in the amygdala gray matter, when using a less conser-
vative statistical threshold. The lack of reports of amygdala gray
matter reductions in previous studies might be accounted for by
the statistical threshold applied and/or the fact that apart from
hippocampal formation, other medio-temporal lobe regions did
not undergo rigorous volumetric quantifications (Vargha-Khadem
et al., 2003; Rosenbaum et al., 2011). In line with other studies
showing damage to thalamic areas after episodes of (perinatal)
hypoxia (Jacob and Pyrkosch, 1951; Voit et al., 1987; Markowitsch
et al., 1997; Cowan et al., 2003; Macey et al., 2005; de Haan et al.,
2006), we identified indices of reductions in gray matter den-
sity in thalamus, namely in the pulvinar, when we applied a less
conservative statistical threshold (p < 0.001, uncorrected).
The right-sided preponderance of the identified structural
brain changes is relevant, given data suggesting a right hemi-
spheric bias for emotional processing (Schore, 2002), EAM (Fink
et al., 1996; Markowitsch et al., 2000) and “high-order conscious-
ness” (Keenan et al., 2005) (however, for different results, see
Nyberg et al., 2010; Viard et al., 2012).
On the behavioral level, ML shared several similarities with
patients with developmental amnesia, but also displayed some
distinct features (such as atypical school trajectory, different level
of functional independence). He showed evidence of at least aver-
age intelligence; in some measures of intelligence his performance
even was substantially above the normal level. His attention and
concentration abilities were at least average and for some tests,
above average. The same held true for executive functions and
problem solving abilities, which were to a large degree within nor-
mal range. In the Concept Comprehension Test (Cronin-Golomb
et al., 1987a,b) ML showed intact performance for concrete con-
cepts, but sub-average for abstract concepts (Martins et al., 2006;
Quian Quiroga, 2012). This result is congruent with data sug-
gesting a role of hippocampal formation in facilitation of more
complex problem solving, via comparison computations (Olsen
et al., 2012). In the TkS, ML showed impairments comparable to
those of patients with Korsakoff ’s syndrome (Brand et al., 2003a).
These results may have to do with the test’s specification. As men-
tioned above, deficits in the TkS time items had been conjectured
to depend on timing deficits combined with remote memory
impairment (Brand et al., 2003a).
ML’s major and in fact very severe problems were identified in
the domains of long-term memory. This was evident in antero-
grade memory tests where he almost did not recall anything
after half an hour delay. It was – if this comparison is possible
– even more evident when it came to EAM recall. ML was com-
pletely unable to provide authentic memories for personal events,
aside from one, where his father jumped out of the window in
a suicide attempt. The recall of this extraordinary event can be
compared with the islands of knowledge that had been found in
patient H.M. of Scoville and Milner (1957) and Corkin (2002).
(After surgical removal of his medial temporal lobe regions bilat-
erally, H.M. was completely anterogradely amnesic. Exceptions
were that he could recall the death of his parents, the killing of
President Kennedy, and a particular song. All these were, however,
semanticized memories; cf. Markowitsch, 1985.)
ML showed impairments in both semantic and episodic–
autobiographical anterograde memory. He for example had no
recollection of a previous meeting with one of his examiners (AS),
although he admitted to a feeling of familiarity. He was able to
recall factual aspects of his meetings with examiner SB, but these
memories did not have an episodic quality. In particular they
lacked contextual details and the subjective feeling of reliving. In
contrast to his performance on various anterograde explicit mem-
ory tests, his old semantic knowledge was good, which suggests
a use of compensatory strategies (Rosenbaum et al., 2011). His
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performance on free recall was worse than that on recognition
which is consistent with findings from patients with developmen-
tal amnesia (Adlam et al., 2009). Adlam et al. (2009) reported
a dissociation between recall and recognition; this was however
incomplete, in the sense that their patients with developmental
amnesia displayed (similarly to ML) a subtle, but significant visual
recognition impairment in the Doors test. ML’s poor performance
on prospectivememory tests mirrors data suggesting a role for hip-
pocampal formation in prospection (however, see Markowitsch
and Staniloiu, 2012 for controversial results). Prospective mem-
ory impairments have been linked not only to deficits in executive
functions, but also to deficits in semantic memory and episodic-
autobiographical memory (Hainselin et al., 2011). Apart from the
hippocampal formation, the amygdala was also suggested to be
involved in the simulation of future emotional events. In par-
ticular, a strong connectivity between rostral anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) and amygdala was observed during the imagination
of positive future events (Sharot et al., 2007) and was postulated to
underlie traits like optimism bias.
ML’s performance on tasks that tap on social information pro-
cessing abilities revealed both domains of preserved performance
and impairment. In the Florida (Tübingen) Affect Battery ML per-
formed well on simple tasks, but he displayed below average per-
formance in themore complex subtests. Difficulties with emotional
processing were also apparent on tests that assessed recognition and
free recall of emotional stimuli. In the picture story for affect induc-
tion (BAd), his performance showed only a marginal benefit from
the enhancing effect of emotional connotation. From a neurobio-
logical perspective, ML’s difficulties with emotional processing may
be related to his gray matter reductions in hippocampal forma-
tion (with an anterior preponderance; Fanselow and Dong, 2010;
Viard et al., 2012), and/or possible amygdala, basal ganglia (cau-
date), and pulvinar dysfunctions (Adolphs, 2010b; Markowitsch
and Staniloiu, 2011b; Geschwind et al., 2012; Kemp et al., 2012;
Nguyen et al., 2013; Saalmann and Kastner, 2013). Performance
on affect-related memory tasks had been found to be impaired
in patients with bilateral amygdala calcifications due to a genetic
disorder (Urbach-Wiethe disease), compared to normal partici-
pants (Sarter and Markowitsch, 1985a,b; Cahill et al., 1995; Siebert
et al., 2003). Similarly to the amygdala (Markowitsch and Staniloiu,
2011b), the pulvinar has been postulated to play a role in detect-
ing salience (van Buren and Borke, 1972; Pessoa, 2011) and, due
to its extensive connections with cortical areas, in the processing
of emotional material (Pessoa, 2008, 2011; Pessoa and Adolphs,
2010). The hippocampal formation has been attributed a role not
only in cognition, but also in emotional processing. In particu-
lar, the anterior hippocampus (which was significantly affected in
our patient) has been assigned a function in emotional process-
ing, reward, goal proximity, and arousal (Fanselow andDong, 2010;
Viard et al., 2012); the nature of functional specialization within the
hippocampal formation in particular (and medio-temporal lobe,
in general) is yet not a solved issue, however (Chua et al., 2007;
Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012). Furthermore, it has been pro-
posed that the function of the hippocampus extends beyond the
mnemonic domain, to support other cognitive areas (such as per-
ception, problem solving) via relational binding and comparison
(Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Olsen et al., 2012).
Some authors hypothesized that the hippocampal formation
may play a role in the experience of emotions about others’
mental states (Immordino-Yang and Singh, 2013). Negative cor-
relations were found in a study between vocally expressed ner-
vousness and regional cerebral blood flow in the right hippocam-
pus (Laukka et al., 2011). Right temporal cortices (including
right anterior temporal structures), the right thalamus, and also
the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortices have been involved in
affective-prosodic comprehension by some studies (Ross and
Monnot, 2011). Additionally, basal ganglia have at times been
implicated in emotional prosody decoding (Paulmann et al.,
2008; Frühholz et al., 2012). While some authors had linked
affective prosody decoding with the right hemisphere, several
others have challenged this view (for a review, see Snitz et al.,
2002; Frühholz et al., 2012). It is perhaps worth mentioning that
the performance of ML on affective prosody tasks resembled in
several respects that of the seven patients with Korsakoff syn-
drome, who were examined by Snitz et al. (2002). Those patients
showed in comparison to control participants impairments in
naming affective prosody when semantic content was incongru-
ent, while both linguistic and affective prosody discriminations
were intact. The authors did not provide a neurobiological expla-
nation for their findings, though they made speculations about
the involvement of the basolateral circuit.
On several standard laboratory tests for ToM, ML showed
normal performance or only mild impairment. These results are
consistent with largely preserved core ToM functions: however,
our findings are slightly different from those of Rabin et al. (2012)
who reported normal performance on standardized tests for ToM
in an adult woman with developmental amnesia. There are sev-
eral factors that may account for the observed differences, such
as the use of different test adaptations (e.g., the German adapta-
tion of the RMET) and the presence of neural correlates’ and sex
differences (Schulte-Rüther et al., 2008; Frank, 2012; Kemp et al.,
2012; Nguyen et al., 2013; Saalmann and Kastner, 2013). In par-
ticular, the imaging study of Frank (2012) found that young men
recruit during a false belief task more brain regions known to be
implicated in episodic memory than young women.
In the Heider and Simmel animation paradigm ML partly
deviated in his responses from those of comparison groups.
Contrary to controls he did not use animated nouns and gave
no description of internal states (Ross and Olson, 2010). On
the other hand, self questionnaires yielded no indications of
difficulties with empathy or perspective-taking apart from the
Saarbrücken Personality Questionnaire (personal distress scale).
As commented above, low personal distress elicited by the distress
of others may reflect decreased conscious fearfulness (Cheetham
et al., 2009), perhaps in the context of an anterior hippocampus
and/or amyg-dalar dysfunction (Maren and Holt, 2004; Fanselow
and Dong, 2010; Feinstein et al., 2011). Incidentally, on the EWL-
N [List of personal adjectives] (Janke and Debus, 1978), both
ML’s mother and ML consistently rejected adjectives synonyms
to “fearful” as applying to ML.
ML’s results on the approachability task could be interpreted
as evidence of increased sociability and/or decreased aversiveness.
He tended to overrate (both negative and positive) faces as being
approachable. These findings corresponded to observations from
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ML’s everyday life behavior. From a neurobiological perspective,
an interaction between insula (which has bidirectional connec-
tions to amygdala) and hippocampus was found to be important
for processing of untrustworthy faces (Tsukiura et al., 2012).
Furthermore, decreased aversiveness and/or hypersociability have
been related to various amygdala dysfunctions (Bellugi et al.,
1999; Martens et al., 2009). It is possible that the hypersociability
may stem inML’s case from decreased fearfulness/aversion, which
may be underlain by an anterior hippocampus and/or amygdalar
dysfunction (Maren and Holt, 2004; Fanselow and Dong, 2010;
Feinstein et al., 2011).
No tendency for risky behavior was identified in ML by his
performance in the Game of Dice Task. This finding is in some
contradiction with his increased trustworthiness leading him to
engage in potentionally risky or dangerous behaviors.
Tests of malingering partly yielded results which – for an indi-
vidual with normal conscious mnemonic processing abilities –
would be indicative of feigning. As ML was quite deficient in
memory recall of new material in general, these test outcomes
cannot be interpreted as indicative of feigning. Based on our
objective multidimensional assessment and the collateral infor-
mation we obtained, we concluded that it was extremely unlikely
that ML was trying to feign his impairments (either for an exter-
nal incentive, such as in malingering or for deliberately trying to
assume the sick role).
CONCLUSION
Episodic–autobiographical memory contains a wealth of informa-
tion about people and social interactions; this led several authors
to hypothesize that the exchange of EAM might facilitate social
cognition, such as understanding of others’ inner world and per-
spective (Nelson and Fivush, 2004; Spreng et al., 2008) and sub-
sequently might connect and “draw the world together” (Casey,
2000, p. 313). In a review article, Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory
(2011) argued that, while primarily perception-based, the repre-
sentation of mental states of others might also be computed by
resorting to internally stored information such as from episodic-
autobiographical memories. Data coming from a study of healthy
participants suggested that laboratory ToM tasks engagemore cog-
nitively economical ways than accessing own EAMs (Rabin et al.,
2010), relying on semantic knowledge and/or implicit process-
ing (Adolphs, 2010a; Staniloiu et al., 2010b). Yet another study,
which investigated the role of hippocampus in emotional mental-
izing, proposed that mentalizing is modulated bymemories of past
events (Perry et al., 2011). Interesting data came from a recent
study of Rabin and Rosenbaum (2012), which showed that in
healthy female participants the functional relation between auto-
biographical memory and ToM is modulated by the familiarity
of the target person in a ToM task, which in turn affected the
employment of cognitive strategies.
Herein we used a broad variety of tests and found objective
evidence of intact areas as well as impaired domains of social infor-
mation processing in a young adultmale patient with amnesia with
neurodevelopmental mechanisms, which preponderantly afflicted
episodic–autobiographical mnemonic processing. Consistent with
data from other authors (Rabin et al., 2012), we identified in ML’s
case largely preserved ability to perform on a number of tasks
testing core ToM functions; this is in line with suggestions that nei-
ther intact EAMnor an intact hippocampal formation are essential
for core social cognitive processes (Rosenbaum et al., 2007; Rabin
et al., 2012). Impairments were however detected in ML’s case
on certain tasks taping on complex social perception or complex
social judgments. These results could be interpreted in differ-
ent ways. The hippocampal formation has been attributed roles
in relational binding (flexible association of disparate items) and
comparison computations (Olsen et al., 2012). The hippocampus-
related relational binding was proposed to underlie constructive
processes linked to EAM, mental scene construction, and self-
projection (Spreng et al., 2008; Addis et al., 2009; Rosenbaum
et al., 2009; Spreng and Grady, 2010) (but, see McKinlay et al.,
2009; Squire et al., 2010 for different opinions). Furthermore,
hippocampus-mediated constructive processes were suggested in a
recent study to be implicated in both EAM and ToM tasks targeting
familiar individuals (Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012). An interesting
idea was however put forth by Olsen et al. (2012). The authors
stated: “Thus, while binding and comparison computations may
be mediated by multiple neural regions, the hippocampus is crit-
ical for these computations when relational information must be
maintained over longer delays and/or when information has a high
degree of conceptual/perceptual overlap, regardless of whether the
information must be maintained over a delay or merely discrimi-
nated in the presentmoment” (Olsen et al., 2012, p. 10). Along this
vein we could argue that our findings support ideas that an intact
hippocampal formation might be necessary for adequate perfor-
mance on tasks that require demanding, complex (perceptual)
information processing, involving complex relational information
and/or a need for longer online holding of complex relational
information (Olsen et al., 2012).
Alternative explanations for our results may be linked to
our voxel-based morphometry data, which pointed to indices of
reduced gray matter in amygdala, basal ganglia, and pulvinar,
when a less conservative threshold was used. All these struc-
tures were described to make contribution to social cognition
and social information processing (Jacobson, 1986; Adolphs et al.,
1998, 1999, 2005; Shaw et al., 2004; Pessoa, 2008, 2011; Adolphs,
2010a,b; Bodden et al., 2010a,b; Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010; Kemp
et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2013; Saalmann and Kastner, 2013).
Furthermore, several of these structures were reported to be
affected in various memory disorders (Zingerle, 1912; Schuster,
1936; Smyth and Stern, 1938; Stern, 1939;Guard et al., 1986; Kuljis,
1994; Mori et al., 1999; Siebert et al., 2003; Allen et al., 2006).
While white matter changes were not detected on visual inspec-
tion in the case of ML, subtle white matter changes due to hypoxia
cannot be ruled out and would require more refined imaging tech-
niques in order to be captured (Paus, 2010). Their detection may
however be relevant for a number of reasons: there are numerous
reports on amnesia arising after white matter lesions (Horel, 1978;
Zola-Morgan et al., 1982;Markowitsch et al., 1990; Calabrese et al.,
1995; Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012); furthermore, there are
some reports of ToM impairments occurring after white matter
tract damage (Bach et al., 1998; Happé et al., 2001).
Due to their non-uniformity, our findings draw attention to
the need of employing several tests for assessing social informa-
tion processing. Furthermore, they call for testing social cognition
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in real life settings or conditions that approximate real life settings,
in order to fully assess the extent of disability and appreciate any
contribution that EAMmay play to understanding the inner world
of others and “drawing the world together” (Casey, 2000, p. 313).
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